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Abstract 
Contracting has a significant impact on the acquisition process efficiency, especially in the 
context of so-called public–private partnership (PPP). Improper contracts may cause 
significant delay and additional costs in project execution due to opportunistic behavior of 
private-sector suppliers. We present a system dynamics model combined with a web based 
management cockpit for project contracting and interactive decision support which can be 
used to train project purchasers showing that carefully designed contracts help to keep the 
project on schedule and bring benefits to both the governmental entities and the private-
sector suppliers. 
Introduction 
Delays in a public–private partnership project cause a two-fold disadvantages for the 
contracting authority. Firstly, the planned features often are not available during the period 
of delay. Secondly, in many cases, due to the delay the features are partly already out of 
date when they are put into use. However, improvement of the project contracting process 
may have a significant contribution to reduce project delays, additional costs and improve 
outcome of the project. 
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In our research we want to analyze how project contracts that include carefully 
designed timely penalties may help to keep a project on track and within the planned 
timeline. The proposed system dynamics model in combination with the web based 
management cockpit for project contracting and interactive decision support is developed at 
the Universität der Bundeswehr München (Germany) and shall be used for teaching project 
contracting in the future. 
In this paper we start with a literature review to examine three related research 
issues: public–private partnership, opportunistic behavior and contracting, as well as project 
contracting from the view of system dynamics. After that, we describe our concept 
development using a web based management cockpit with an underlying system dynamics 
model for project contracting and interactive decision support, along with some preliminary 
results. Thereby, a better understanding of the problem and the relation between the 
contracting authority on the one side and the private-sector project supplier on the other side 
can be achieved. 
Literature Review 
Public–Private Partnership 
The evolution of the New Public Management (NPM) idea in the 1980s has shifted 
the emphasis in the public sector away from stress on process to a stress on output (Hood, 
1995). One concept within NPM concerns the use of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in 
order to offer infrastructure and services to the public efficiently. The interest of many 
nations to take use of PPPs is attributed among others to faster delivery and reduced whole 
life costs of public infrastructure and services, improved quality, and the generation of 
additional revenues (European Commission, 2003). Especially in a time of financial 
shortfalls and cuts in public budgets together with increasing infrastructure costs, PPPs 
become a popular option for many nations (Winch, 2012). 
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 The Public–Private Partnership Environment  
(Provost, 2011) 
Even though there is no universally accepted definition of PPP (Khanom, 2009), this 
kind of partnership lies somewhere between delivery of infrastructure and services by public 
sector organizations and total privatization of these tasks. The National Council for Public-
Private Partnerships explains the term PPP as means of utilizing private-sector resources in 
a way that is a blend of outsourcing and privatization (National Council, 2002, p. 4). Iossa et 
al. describe public–private partnership from the infrastructure point of view as a long-term 
contractual arrangement between the public sector and the private sector in which the 
private sector is responsible for significant aspects of the building and operation of an 
infrastructure for the delivery of public services (Iossa, 2007, p. 3). More generally speaking, 
a “PPP is a partnership between the public sector and the private sector for the purpose of 
delivering a project or a service traditionally delivered by the public sector” (European 
Commission, 2003, p. 16). PPP may involve design, construction, financing, operation and 
maintenance of public infrastructure, facilities, or the operation of services to meet public 
needs. The UK for example has a large body of experience in funding public infrastructure 
with private capital, the so called Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (National Audit Office, 
2011). Figure 1 “provides a general overview of the public and private sector participants 
and activities that can surround a PPP project or programme. It shows each sector’s inputs 
into the process from policy development to service delivery” (Provost, 2011). 
Resources, risks, and rewards are shared between public and private entities by—
mostly long-term—contracts (National Council, 2009). This allows each party to do what it 
does best. While private entities are responsible for operational aspects, the public sector 
has to set its focus on planning, contracting and monitoring (European Commission, 2003). 
As a result, sufficient commercial skills are indispensible for public entities to manage PPP 
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projects, which in most cases are complex projects, successfully (National Audit Office, 
2009). What happens when there is a lack of these skills is illustrated in the following 
example. 
Since the 1980s, the mayor of Farum, Denmark has followed an active strategy 
relying on contracting out and, later, PPPs for delivering various public services. In 2002 the 
issue about the PPP contract for construction of the soccer stadium and the sports arena, 
and inadequate money spending led to a local governmental scandal and the mayor’s leave. 
The main reason for the failure of PPP in this case was the fact that the structure of the 
contractual governance scheme in Farum was too complex for the mayor to oversee the 
resources (Greve, 2002, p. 2). 
Setting up adequate contracts (a “multidimensional model for PPP contracting” can 
be found in Zarco-Jasso, 2005) by which risks are transferred from the public to the private 
sector is a critical success factor for PPP projects (Daly, 2004). To do this, it is essential for 
public officials to understand how commercial levers work (George, 2009). Without such 
skills the likelihood of a less than optimal contractual outcome is significantly increased 
(Campbell, 2011). 
Opportunistic Behavior and Contracting 
Regarding the regulatory and institutional framework, the quality of contract 
enforceability and governance are a critical factor affecting PPP agreements (Iossa, 2007, p. 
6). Aspects of the contract design, such as the risk allocation or the payment mechanism, 
significantly affect the PPP outcomes (Iossa, 2007, p. 7). The sheer complexity of PPP 
contracts makes opportunistic behavior a key issue for the success of a PPP project. A 
crucial point is the opportunism which plays an important role for interparty collaboration in 
every project. On the one hand, opportunism increases transaction costs in repeated 
exchange mainly because of the crucial fact that covert behavior seeking unilateral gains 
are difficult to observe and to verify. On the other hand, opportunism can be seen as a 
significant obstacle to fostering confidence in partner cooperation, and consequently the risk 
of opportunism may escalates interparty conflicts (Luo, 2007, p. 857). 
Opportunistic behavior can be generally described as taking the opportunity to 
manage earnings in order to maximize their own utilities at the expense of the contracting 
parties and stakeholders (Sun, 2008, p. 407). In details, opportunistic behavior can be 
explained as the usage of information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders to 
maximize their utility in dealing with compensation contracts, debt contracts and regulations. 
Furthermore, investors are thereby misled by the unreliable information reported (Sun, 2008, 
p. 410). Consequently, it can be said that opportunism represents a significant obstacle to 
fostering confidence in partner cooperation, and the risk of opportunism escalates interparty 
conflicts. In other words, opportunistic parties do their own thing and emphasize their own 
interests, hence weakening the basic foundation for collaboration (Luo, 2007, p. 857).  
Especially a lack of quality control during the project and additional institutional 
setting allows for opportunistic behavior, increases the likelihood of dealing with inadequate 
service suppliers, and represents a performance risk for the client (see, e.g., Glückler, 2003, 
p. 289). Therefore, one successful way to reduce this opportunistic behavior is personal 
experience that evolves from interaction between clients and consultants which becomes 
most important in reducing uncertainty and controlling for opportunistic behavior (Glückler, 
2003, p. 270).  
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 1, delays in a public–private partnership 
project cause a two-fold disadvantage for the contracting authority. In addition, Wood 
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identifies schedule delays as a cost driver of major defense programs (Wood, 2012). A 
central task of a properly concluded contract must thus include a functional project schedule 
management. 
Bernheim and Whinston developed a formal model and showed that making the 
contract more explicit may further encourage opportunistic behavior surrounding actions that 
cannot be specified within contracts (Bernheim, 1998, p. 921). Nevertheless, the capacity for 
contracts to adequately safeguard relationship-specific investments against opportunistic 
behavior by a contractual partner is limited (Mayer, 2004, p. 396). 
Project Contracting and System Dynamics 
The complexity inherent in many projects exceeds human imagination by far. 
Although among the most important activities in modern society, large-scale and long-term 
projects are one of the least organized activities. Therefore, it is no wonder that these kinds 
of projects typically experience additional costs, delays and quality problems. Over several 
years Cooper and Mullen analyzed some major projects in different industries (Cooper, 
1993). They reported that commercial software projects are more expensive by about 140% 
than planned and lasted about 190% longer as originally scheduled. For military projects, his 
analysis reported that there were even 310% additional costs and 460% delay. Another 
study of transportation infrastructure projects reports a cost overrun in nine out of 10 
projects (Flyvbjerg, 2002). Rail projects, fixed-links projects (bridges and tunnels), and road 
projects experience an average cost overrun of 28%. According to Flyvbjerg, “the private 
sector, the public sector, and private/public sector partnerships have a dismal record of 
delivering on large infrastructure cost and performance promises” (Flyvbjerg, 2009, p. 170). 
Some “famous” examples include the implementation of a tolling system for German 
motorways (Toll Collect), the construction of the Eurotunnel connecting France and the UK, 
and the Sydney Opera house. Nowadays, the extreme delay and cost overrun of Berlin’s 
new airport BER (Niemeier, 2013) let classify this large scale infrastructure project as failed. 
According to the Project Management Institute, a “project is a temporary endeavor 
undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result” (PMI, 2004, p. 5). With this 
definition in mind, every project has to keep the balance of “The Iron Triangle” (Atkinson, 
1999): time, cost, and quality. In PPP projects the objectives of the project, the delivering 
date, and the price paid are fixed in a contract. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 258 - 
 
 PPP and System Dynamics—New Form of Decision Support 
The private partner, that is, the private supplier, is responsible for delivering the 
project objectives in accordance to the contract. He has to spend and assign resources, 
among others human resources, to best meet these objectives. To reduce complexity, large 
scale projects are usually divided into manageable deliverables in form of a so called work 
breakdown structure (see NASA, 2010). The elements in the work breakdown structure are 
sub-results and define the tasks which have to be fulfilled during the project execution. On 
the other hand, the public partner, that is, the contracting authority, has to reward the 
supplier for the contractual deliverables. The delivered results create a benefit for the public. 
A key aspect for successful project delivery, that is on time, on budget, and on value, 
is to handle project complexity (Baccarini, 1996). The evolution of information technology 
provides methods and tools to support this task by modeling and simulation (Mizzel, 2007). 
One of the computer-aided modeling methods is system dynamics (Figure 2). Properly 
developed system dynamics models may provide decision support in the project 
development phase and the support in making decisions concerning the project schedule 
with a long-term focus on the realization (Lyneis, 2001, p. 241). 
One of the strengths of system dynamics is the representation of the 
interdependencies within a project and the subsequent tracking of changes in the model. It 
can be said that system dynamics consists of one of the most developed plans for action, 
the optimal representation, analysis and detailed explanation of dynamics in complex 
technical systems as well as in entrepreneurial systems (Sterman, 1992, p. 6f.). Additional 
costs and delays can be detected early. System dynamics should be regarded as an 
additional method for decision support in project management to the existing, traditional 
project management methods. Especially when handling complex project dynamics, based 
on causal relationships, feedback loops, time delays and non-linearity, system dynamics can 
regarded as a potential method (Sterman, 1992, p. 9). 
Summary 
System dynamics modeling and simulation is an effective instrument to understand 
and to improve project contracting process efficiency in many ways. We propose to develop 
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a new approach via system dynamics model for project execution based on (Lyneis, 2001) 
and our previous research projects. 
Concept Development 
A Web Based Management Cockpit for Project Contracting 
As shown by previous studies, both accuracy of the mental model of the participants 
for a complex managerial task (Gary, 2005) and data presentation (Leopold-Wildburger, 
2013) may influence the performance of an interactive decision process. 
As discussed in the literature review, understanding opportunistic behavior during 
PPP acquisition and execution is a critical success factor for PPP projects. The right hand 
side of the causal loop diagram (CLD) depicted in Figure 3 illustrates how understanding of 
opportunism is embedded in a feedback loop. Understanding of opportunism influences 
positively the quality of the PPP contract. The better the quality of contract the fewer 
opportunistic behavior of the private partner is to be expected. In turn, project outcome will 
benefit. Following the link, project outcome impacts project complexity. The higher the 
former, the lower the latter is and vice versa. When the project is very complex, the 
understanding of opportunism suffers. On the other hand, a reduced project complexity 
simplifies understanding of opportunism. In addition, project complexity has a negative 
relationship to quality of contract. 
 
 A Causal Loop Diagram of Project Contracting and Management Cockpit 
Besides reducing project complexity, another solution does exist to increase the 
understanding of opportunistic behavior. This is can be seen on the left hand side of the 
CLD (Figure 3). A high understanding of opportunism results in a high quality of SD model of 
project acquisition. As a consequence, the quality of the management cockpit (MC) 
increases as well. A well designed and implemented management cockpit enhances the 
usage by acquisition students. This, in turn, impacts positively the understanding of 
opportunism directly and indirectly via a higher level of acquisition training. Therefore, to 
control the understanding of opportunism the design and implementation of an adequate 
management cockpit is key. A properly developed and accessible management cockpit 
should support both acquisition research and acquisition training. 
Based on Hu (2011), we develop a prototype of a web based management cockpit 
for interactive project contracting. The system architecture of the whole platform which the 
prototype is embedded in is shown in Figure 4. 
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 System Architecture of the Collaborative Modeling and Experiment 
Platform 
The core element of our prototype is a system dynamics model. To be able to 
integrate the newest research results, the platform is designed in such a way that this model 
can be easily replaced by a new version or even another system dynamics model. A web 
based tool not only facilitates deployment but also enhances collaboration. Furthermore, 
such a tool helps to present data in a more understandable fashion and supports information 
management. Thereby, users are able to achieve better decisions (Roth, 2010). 
To implement the web based management cockpit, we extend our specific system 
dynamics model by an accessible user interface. Students will be invited to use the 
management cockpit for interactive decision support on project contracting. By analyzing 
their results and experiences, we will gain new insights into opportunistic behavior during 
the acquisition and contraction phase of a PPP project. 
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 Use Case Diagram for a Web Based Management Cockpit for Interactive 
Project Contracting 
The management cockpit will be tested by students in groups. Each of the 
participants will act as a project director. For several successive rounds, they will compete 
against each other under certain PPP contract conditions. Before the start of a test, 
participants will be provided with a detailed description of the PPP project itself, its 
contracting details and common rules. In addition, they will receive explicit instructions on 
how to use the web tool (Figure 5). Decision-makers of both public contracting authority and 
private sector supplier are involved. 
The participants will take turns in acting from the public and from the private side. 
Main task for the public side will be setting of project contracting indicator values for the 
specified project. On the other side, as private contractors, the students will be required to 
pay attention on their profit and on fulfillment of the project. The focus is on necessary 
resources, that is, number of employees, for project implementation. Figure 6 shows the 
web user interface. During a simulated project, the management cockpit informs the 
participants interactively about project contract and execution details, including the following: 
 Money (earned by) Supplier—measured in person‧month 
 Number of tasks to be executed according the project Plan—measured in 
person‧month 
 Penalty—measured in person‧month 
 Number of tasks which are Really Done—measured in person‧month 
 Team Size—measured in person 
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 Web User Interface. Left: Choosing Project Contracting Option by Public 
Contracting Authority; Right: Simulating Project Execution by Private 
Sector Supplier 
Our web based management cockpit for project contracting and interactive decision 
support offers the possibility to track participants’ opportunistic behavior in decision-making 
during the progress of a simulated PPP project in a competitive environment as well as 
other key indicators for PPP projects. During a simulation run, all relevant data is stored for 
analysis in a preprocessing step. This allows identifying participants’ learning and adaption 
processes as well as the identification of well working policies. 
Preliminary Results 
As a first step, the students are all asked to play the role of a private sector 
contractor. Figures 7 and 8 show the results of project execution by two students. Four 
projects of two different contract terms have to be executed. The term options are given to 
them successively: 
1. pay per delivery + 30% penalty for delay 
2. pay per delivery only 
3. pay per delivery + 30% penalty for delay 
4. pay per delivery only 
Notice that in our simulations a delay penalty (if any) may be already payable during the 
project execution. In the practice this makes necessary detailed project planning and 
monitoring processes on the side of public contracting authorities. 
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 Project Execution by Student A 
 
 Project Execution by Student B 
Comparing project execution #2 to #4 by both students, it is obviously that both 
students have learnt quickly that a smaller team size and thus a longer project duration is 
beneficial for project suppliers, if there is no danger of delay penalty. In other words, they 
learnt quickly to behave opportunistically. The difference between the execution #3 and #4, 
which is significant in the case of Student A and visible in the case of Student B, indicates 
the potential of a contract term of delay penalty to reduce the negative impact of such an 
opportunistic behavior. 
Behind the Scenes: A System Dynamics Model of Project Contracting 
The system dynamics model which we have developed for our web based 
management cockpit for project contracting and interactive decision support does not only 
has a theoretical but also a more practical oriented background. Developing and deploying 
effective concepts and tools supporting contracting officials during their contracting and 
strategic planning activities is however an essential and long-term task. 
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 Parameter Set Describing a Project 
The current existing version of our model is capable of displaying the key indicators 
which are essential both for the contracting authority as well as for the project supplier. The 
basic parameter set describing a project includes the tasks (measured in person‧month) to 
be executed within certain agreed duration (month) and those ones which are really done 
(person‧month), as well as the money earned by the supplier (person‧month), the money 
(person‧month) spent by the contracting authority or the client and the cumulative benefit 
(person‧month2) of the project over the time (Figure 9). 
 
 Project Execution 
During project progress, planned tasks are completed. Therefore, planned tasks will 
change into the status done. However, not every executed task produces the intended 
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results but type I or type II errors (Atkinson, 1999). In these cases, work is done wrong 
respectively not as well as it could have been. Hence, these tasks need rework and change 
again into the status planned tasks. The fraction of tasks needing rework depends on Team 
Quality. On the other hand, tasks that are completed successfully pass into really done. 
The model reflects this project executing structure (Figure 10). Similar models can be 
found for example in (Lyneis, 2007; Garcia, 2009; Sterman, 2000). 
 
 Benefits of the Project Client and the Financial Aspects 
The next modeling step is to reflect the financial flows (Payment, Penalty, Interest 
and Costs) and other dependencies (Figure 11). The contract’s term of payment is set by 
Frac which is the fraction of payment on a pay-per-delivery basis. A number bigger than 1 
means a penalty applies for each delayed person month according the Plan. From the point 
of view of a public project client the more tasks are finished, the more Features can be put 
into use. Notice that for certain IT and other high-tech projects the Half Life during which the 
time specific benefit is reduced to the half the original planned value can be as short as 24 
months. 
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 Possible Opportunistic Behavior Regarding the Team Size 
Finally, two variants of the model are realized. Using the first one, shown in Figure 
12, each participant acts as a possibly opportunistic project supplier. Depending on the 
value of Frac it may be beneficial to reduce Team Size at the cost of a significant project 
delay. Frac and Team Size are the two parameters which are to be controlled through the 
user interface shown in Figure 6. 
 
 Opportunistic Computer Player 
Figure 13 shows another model variant in which the opportunistic behavior is literally 
programmed. A participant of the interactive decision support based on such a model acts 
as a public project client designing a contract, or in other words, defining the value of Frac. 
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Conclusions 
Delays in public–private partnership projects cause significant disadvantages for 
public contracting authorities. In our research we want to analyze how project contracts that 
include carefully designed timely penalties may help to keep a project on track and within 
the planned timeline. 
We have developed a prototype of a web based management cockpit for interactive 
project contracting. Core element of our prototype is a system dynamics model which can be 
easily replaced by a new version or even anther system dynamics model to reflect the 
newest research results. 
The described web based management cockpit allows students to play the role of 
both parties involved in PPP project acquisition and contracting: public contracting authority 
and private sector contractor. During a simulated project, the management cockpit informs 
the participants interactively about project contract and execution details. Observing 
students’ actions allows understanding different effects of specific decisions and thereby 
helps to gain important insights into critical interdependencies of PPP project key indicators. 
On the one hand, these key indicators are the money invested by the public authority, the 
project’s cumulative benefit, and the project duration. All three can be regarded as the key 
performance indicators for the public partner. He aims to maximize the cumulative project by 
simultaneously minimizing the money to be invested and project duration. On the other 
hand, there are the key performance indicators for the private partner: money spent and 
project duration. Foremost, the private sector contractor aims to maximize profit. He can do 
this by controlling project duration and resources assigned to the project, that is, manpower. 
As expected, some of the students have learnt quickly to reduce team size to 
maximize the profit at the expense of a longer project duration. Our preliminary results 
indicate also the potential of a contract term of delay penalty to reduce the negative impact 
of such an opportunistic behavior. 
This management cockpit is planned to be extended in future research. There 
already exists the concept that new models with a variety of adapted indicator sets will be 
used for additional interactive decision support. 
Summary 
From our point of view, this specific web based management cockpit in combination 
with the underlying system dynamics model offers a high grade of flexibility and 
attractiveness for use in the area of project contracting issues with an international focus. 
Generally speaking, system dynamics can be seen as a powerful decision support tool 
which can be used in a variety of ways when implemented in a web based management 
cockpit for decision-makers in project contracting. 
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